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Abstract: An elementary algebra identifies conceptual and corresponding 
applicational limitations in John Kemeny and Paul Oppenheim’s (K-O) 1956 
model of theoretical reduction in the sciences. The K-O model was once widely 
accepted, at least in spirit, but seems afterward to have been discredited, or in 
any event superceeded. Today, the K-O reduction model is seldom mentioned, 
except to clarify when a reduction in the Kemeny-Oppenheim sense is not 
intended. The present essay takes a fresh look at the basic mathematics of K-O 
comparative vocabulary theoretical term reductions, from historical and 
philosophical standpoints, as a contribution to the history of the philosophy of 
science. The K-O theoretical reduction model qualifies a theory replacement as 
a successful reduction when preconditions of explanatory adequacy and 
comparable systematicization are met, and there occur fewer numbers of 
theoretical terms identified as replicable syntax types in the most economical 
statement of a theory’s putative propositional truths, as compared with the 
theoretical term count for the theory it replaces. The challenge to the historical 
model developed here, to help explain its scope and limitations, involves the 
potential for equivocal theoretical meanings of multiple theoretical term tokens 
of the same syntactical type. 
Keywords: John Kemeny, Kemeny-Oppenheim (K-O) model of theoretical 
reduction, Paul Oppenheim, theoretical reduction, science, scientific theory 
 
1. Kemeny-Oppenheim (K-O) Model 
The reduction of secondary to primary sciences encounters difficulties where 
reduction procedures are described as involving comparisons of unspecified 
‘terms’ that leave their individuation and denumeration undetermined. The 1956 
Kemeny-Oppenheim (K-O) model of scientific and more generally theoretical 
reduction prescribes a reduction procedure that involves a method for the array 
and elimination of theoretical ‘terms,’ but does not explain what is to count as a 
term.  
The omission turns out to have important implications in applying the K-O 
model. The difficulties entailed by this lack of clarity about the nature of terms 
apply to Kemeny and Oppenheim’s treatment of theoretical reduction, but can 
also be raised in a general way against any attempt to set forth procedures of 
reduction that involve enumerations of theoretical terms and vocabularies 
before and after the replacement of one set of equivalently explanatorily capable 
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competing theories for another at the propositional level. Kemeny and 
Oppenheim do not suggest that a reduction is achieved when the number of 
theoretical terms is reduced from alternative equally explanatorily powerful and 
systematic theory.  
When K-O preconditions are satisfied, when the reducing theory explains 
all the same relevant observational data that the reduced theory explains, and 
the reducing theory is at least as well systematized as the reduced theory, 
however the concept of being systematized is more exactly interpreted and 
applied, then there results a K-O theoretical reduction marked criteriologically 
by a reduction in the number of theoretical term types from the reduced to the 
reducing theoretical vocabulary. The further moral in the fate of the K-O model 
of theoretical reduction in the sciences has to do with the limits of considering 
only syntax tokens and types, and the need also to go beyond Kemeny and 
Oppenheim by including the meanings and full-blooded semantic interpretations 
of terms and expressions in an adequate metatheory of the term token economy 
in comparative theoretical explanation. There is, in other words, more to 
reduction, even when K-O preliminary conditions are satisfied, than counting up 
the number of minimally needed term tokens on both sides of a theoretical 
reduction undertaken at the propositional level, when a reduced theory is 
replaced by a reducing theory. 
The informal discussion Kemeny and Oppenheim present in their 
influential co-authored essay “On Reduction” explains theoretical reduction in 
the sciences in terms of several factors. When satisfied, they are supposed to 
produce as a consequence a numerical reduction in the number of theoretical 
terms needed to express the truths of reduced and reducing scientific theory for 
purposes of comparing their respective cardinalities. The comparative 
vocabulary K-O theoretical reduction model, as the authors acknowledge and 
intend, is easily and equally attractively extended to all systematic branches of 
knowledge possessing an identifiable terminology in which explanations are 
expressed. It is accordingly not just our understanding and ability intelligently to 
pursue theoretical reductions within the natural sciences in a narrow sense that 
is at stake, but all propositional knowledge involving explanatory propositions. 
Kemeny and Oppenheim believe that theoretical reduction contributes to 
progress in scientific understanding, because it brings science closer to more 
basic principles of explanation, which can in turn make a scientific theoretical 
explanation more practically applicable, easier to grasp in its most fundamental 
principles, and potentially establishing insightful conceptual connections 
between the special sciences.  
Kemeny and Oppenheim formulate what has come to be known as a 
vocabulary count model of theoretical reduction. They adopt Thomas Nagel’s 
terminology to formulate the basic principle of reduction in the sciences: 
In a reduction we are presented with two theories T
1
 and T
2
, and with the 
observational knowledge of today represented by the complex sentence 
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t
O...The theoretical vocabulary of T
2
, Voc(T
2
), contains terms which are not in 
Voc(T
1
)...But it turns out that T
1
 can explain all that T
2
 can, and it is no more 
complex. Hence we drop T
2
 from our body of theories, and strike out all the 
terms in Voc(T
2
) which are not in T
1
. Then we say that T
2
 has been reduced to 
T
1.
1
 
The authors consider four definitions to bring precision and clarity to the 
concept of theoretial reduction in the form of a rational reconstruction of the 
general requirements for an adequate reduction.2 They outline three conditions 
that are supposed to be sufficient to effect a reduction in the sciences from a 
secondary scientific theory T
2
 to a primary scientific theory T
1
. According to their 
interpretation, T
2
 has been reduced to T
1
 when: 
(i) T
1
 can explain all that T
2
 can. 
(ii) T
1
 is no more complex than T
2
. 
(iii) Hence: Drop T
2
 from our body of scientific theories, and strike out all 
the terms in Voc(T
2
) that do not occur in Voc(T
1
).3 
The account has the form of an enthymematic practical syllogism, or a 
sequential procedure to follow in effecting a theoretial reduction. It considers 
the theoretical terms of any pair of theories under consideration, with reference 
to potential differences in the cardinalities of the sets of theoretical terms 
contained in competing reduction candidates. The theory is judged ontically 
most economical among those with equivalent explanatory competence and 
systematization, whose complete set of theoretical terms has the least 
cardinality. We assume whatever systematization Kemeny and Oppenheim 
expect in their requirement (3) for a reducing theoretical explanation relative to 
any theory it reduces. When conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied by theories T
1
 
and T
2
, then we are instructed to implement directive (iii), by which the 
theoretical reduction of T
2
 to T
1
 is supposed to be achieved.4  
                                                                        
1 Kemeny and Oppenheim 1956, 9. 
2 Kemeny and Oppenheim 1956, 7: “As this process has been the subject of much philosophical 
controversy, it is the task of the philosopher of science to give a rational reconstruction of the 
essential features of reduction.” See Swanson 1962, Schaffner 1967, and the papers collected 
in Agazzi 1991 and in Milkov and Peckhaus 2013. 
3 Kemeny and Oppenheim 1956, 8-9. 
4 Nagel (1951; 1961) is often acknowledged as the chief exponent of classical reduction in the 
sciences. In 1951, 299, Nagel distinguishes between reduction principles of definability and 
derivability. Feyerabend (1962) attacks the principle of derivability in Nagel’s analysis of 
scientific reduction on the grounds that the meaning-invariance it presupposes does not 
obtain in possible instances of reduction. See also Coffa 1967, 500. Kemeny and Oppenheim’s 
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2. Resilience of the K-O Model 
The continuing intrigue of the K-O model depends largely on the fact that it 
features what is arguably the only objective measure of anything belonging to 
reduced theories having been literally reduced conceptually or in the cardinality 
of a new science’s referential domain of existent objects. The K-O model 
proposes to count the theoretical term syntax tokens in the complete statements 
of a theory’s putative propositional truths, and in particular to tally up the 
theoretical term tokens in the propositions that each theory advances as true 
explanations. When the relevant propositions are written out, assuming we 
know which terms are theoretical, we can simply highlight every occurrence of a 
theoretical term syntax token as though the words were presented in a two-
dimensional matrix.  
The > -1 algebra for K-O reductions applied to theoretical term tokens in a 
random theory’s inscribed explanations nevertheless reveals the limitations of a 
purely syntactical albeit the only objective criterion of theoretical reduction. The 
implication is that the K-O model, whatever its fate at the hands of previous lines 
of criticism, and regardless of its current reputation and range of philosophical 
acceptance and acknowledged application, or the reverse, should either be: (a) 
rejected and replaced by a metatheory that interprets theoretical reductions in 
terms of the meanings of theoretical terms in reduction candidate theories, and 
not just the syntax of the theoretical term tokens scattered among a theory’s 
propositions; or else (b) a major overhaul of the K-O model would be needed to 
accommodate semantic as well as purely syntactical dimensions of theoretical 
reductions from one choice of theoretical explanatory propositions to another. If 
meaning in the relevant theoretical expressions cannot be understood as purely 
objective, then a further apparently inescapable implication is that theoretical 
reduction in the sciences is also not a purely objective relation, phenomenon or 
occurrence.  
However tempting it may be to turn away from the K-O model as old-
fashioned or unsuited to a significant number of recognized theoretical 
reductions, to follow a trend of disregard for its usefulness in contemporary 
philosophy of science, to the point where few have studied its details, the K-O 
account of theoretical reduction cannot be so easily discounted, even as it braves 
indifference. The model succeeds in its most general form despite criticism and 
neglect because in the end it interprets theoretical reduction as involving a 
literal comparative numerical reduction in the theoretical vocabularies of 
competing scientific theories as the only objective measure of their comparative 
conceptual and consequently respective explanatory economies. To know to 
what concepts and entities a theory makes explanatory ontological 
commitments, the K-O model says that we must count the words that appear as 
                                                                                                                                                       
discussion ignores the principle of derivability for the most part, dealing with the principle of 
definability as bypassing the problem of meaning-invariance. 
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specific syntax items in a typically inscribed statement of the theory’s 
explanations.  
What else are we supposed to be able to do, if we are proceeding 
objectively, scientifically, in arriving at these metatheorical comparisons in 
support of the conclusion that one theory is reducible or has in fact been reduced 
to another? Even in the case of still living theorists who can further explicate 
their explanations by offering forth still more words to digest, and certainly with 
respect to the documented written heritage of theory development in a culture, 
there seems to be no available method except to read or otherwise process and 
evaluate the syntax in which a theory’s explanations are expressed. Such 
considerations provide strong if not finally decisive justification for some form of 
the K-O model in the metatheory of theoretical reduction and its expected 
scientific methodology.      
Elementary algebraic relations of > -1 govern the relative numbers of 
theoretical term tokens that belong to a theory than to the theory to which it is 
K-O reduced. As always, in the original K-O model, explanatory adequacy on both 
sides of theoretical reduction is presupposed, along with other condition to be 
met, so that theoretical reduction, as Kemeny and Oppenheim insist, can 
contribute to scientific progress. Differences in syntax token numbers in 
different choices of theoretical explanations can be understood as signifying both 
comparative economic differences in the numbers of concepts and entities to 
which a theory is ontologically committed, and, secondly, also, the comparative 
simplicity or complexity of such explanations, as reflected in the number of times 
a theoretical term must be employed within a theory’s explanations in order to 
express its explanations.   
3. Critique of the Comparative Vocabulary Reduction Model 
An objection to the K-O model is that all three of the conditions in (i)-(iii) can be 
fulfilled in circumstances in which a theoretical reduction of scientific or other 
explanatory theory T1 from T2 in Kemeny and Oppenheim’s sense is not effected.  
What the underlying algebraic structure of the K-O model seems to reveal, 
demonstrated in a highly simplified application that nevertheless meets the K-O 
conditions, is that the K-O model is woefully inadequate in its inability to support 
correct evaluations of reduction relations in the overwhelming number of 
possible reduction candidates among choices of theoretical terms in the 
vocabularies of competing explanatory theories. The K-O model fails in 
particular for the vast number of random combinatorially available syntactically 
token replicative cases. The argument suggests that the K-O model, on these 
specific grounds, must either be rejected as an inappropriate interpretation of 
the comparative vocabulary concept of theoretical reduction, or, if the 
interpretation is judged correctly to capture the comparative vocabulary 
concept, then the idea of theoretical reduction itself must be rethought as a 
descriptive model of or prescriptive guideline for ideal scientific practice. 
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Theoretical reduction on the K-O model, as previously mentioned, is 
supposed to be progressive, resulting in theoretical explanatory improvements.5 
A genuine theoretical reduction must entail no loss in ability to explain 
phenomena when one theory is reduced to another, and the theory to which 
another is reduced must constitute a simpler or more economical way of 
explaining the same phenomena as the theory from which it is reduced. For 
Kemeny and Oppenheim, the simplification that is expected to result from a 
scientific theoretical reduction produces a greater economy in the number of 
terms in the scientific vocabulary. They begin by asking: 
What are the special features of reduction? Since it is to be progress in science, 
we must certainly require that the new theory should fulfill the role of the old 
one, i.e., that it can explain (or predict) all those facts that the old theory could 
handle. Secondly, we do not recognize the replacement of one theory by 
another as progress recognize the replacement of one theory by another as 
progress unless the new theory compares favorably with the old one in a 
feature that we can very roughly describe as its simplicity...And the special 
feature of reduction is that it accomplishes all this and at the same time allows 
us to effect an economy in the theoretical vocabulary of science.6 
The objection to this reasonable proposal is that the K-O conditions (i)-
(iii) do not necessarily guarantee reduction in the sciences in the relevant sense 
of ‘simplicity’, by effecting a theoretical economy in the scientific vocabulary. The 
argument to demonstrate the limitations of the K-O model of reduction begins 
with an elementary secondary science T
2
 in which the following conditions 
obtain between scientific principles (A,B,C,D) and theoretical observations 
(O
1
,O
2
,O
3
,O
4
): 
(1) A explains O
1
 
(2) B explains O
2
   
(3) C explains O
3
   
(4) D explains O
4
   
Here there are four explanatory scientific laws in one-one correspondence 
with four observations to be explained. This is already an unrealistic 
simplification, because scientific laws are ordinarily assigned the task of 
explaining many observations, and several laws are often needed to explain a 
single observation. Needless to say, besides, most scientific theories additionally 
include more than four scientific laws. Although the theory is simplified in at 
least these ways, it should nevertheless serve the purpose of illustrating a 
                                                                        
5 Kemeny and Oppenheim 1956, 6: “The label ‘reduction’ has been applied to a certain type of 
progress in science.” 
6 Ibid. 
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general point about the limitations of the K-O model of theoretical reduction. 
There can, after all, be theories as basic as this interpretation of T
2
, and if the K-O 
reduction model does not work even in this simple case, then it should probably 
not be expected to provide correct results when extended to increasingly more 
complex and to that extent potentially more realistic applications. 
Consider what the K-O model would call the theoretical ‘terms’ contained 
within or by means of which the four scientific laws (A,B,C,D) of T
2
 are 
expressed.7 Again, somewhat artificially for the sake of argument, suppose that 
the vocabulary of theory T
2
, Voc(T
2
), consists of the follwing vocabulary matrix of 
‘terms’: 
 Voc(T
2
) Secondary Theory (Nonreplicative Case) 
A = {a,a',a'',a'''} explains O
1
 
B = {b,b',b'',b'''}  explains O
2
   
C = {c,c',c'',c'''}  explains O
3
   
D = {d,d',d'',d'''}  explains O
4
  
Grammatically and in other ways formally well-formed combinations of 
these theoretical terms associated with each law make it possible to explain each 
correlated observation. The terms in A, for example, {a,a',a'',a'''}, are used to 
explain O
1
, and so on for O
2
, O
3
, and
 
O
4
. Collectively, the terms belonging to the 
four laws are the theoretical vocabulary of T
2
, Voc(T
2
), and presented above in a 
matrix array.  
4. Theoretical Terms Nonreplicative Cases 
The question is how a reduction of a secondary theory T
2
 to a primary theory T
1
 
can be effected according to the K-O comparative vocabulary model. Two 
patterns of reduction are distinguished, designated as ‘replicative’ and 
‘nonreplicative.’ As a paradigm of the nonreplicative case, to begin explaining the 
difference, suppose that T
2
 above is reduced to T
1
, where T
1
 consists of the 
scientific laws (E,B,C,D), and where law E does a more economical job of 
explaining observation O
1
, by virtue of containing only three terms (e,e',e''). The 
theoretical vocabulary of T
1
 is thus:  
Voc(T
1
) Primary Theory (Nonreplicative Case) 
E = {e,e',e''} explains O
1
 
B = {b,b',b'',b'''}  explains O
2
   
                                                                        
7 Observational or theoretical or both or neither; ‘terms’ simpliciter. See Jacquette 2004. 
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C = {c,c',c'',c'''}  explains O
3
   
D = {d,d',d'',d'''}  explains O
4
  
It appears that: 
(i) T
1 
by hypothesis can explain all that T
2
 can in explaining O
1
-O
4
. 
(ii)  T
1 
is no more complex than T
2
, for it contains the same number of 
laws, and it contains fewer scientific terms (Voc(T
1
) = x = 16, Voc(T
2
) 
= x – 1 = 15). 
(iii)  Hence, we can drop T
2
 from our body of theories, replace it with T
1
, 
and strike out all the terms in the relevant vocabulary that occur in 
Voc(T
2
) but that do not occur in Voc(T
1
), viz.: the terms (a,a',a'',a'''). In 
this way we eliminate all of law A which has become superfluous in 
explaining O
1
 after the discovery, verification, or acceptance of the 
more economical law E, by eliminating its theoretical terms.8 
The fulfillment of these three conditions of the comparative vocabulary K-
O model qualifies this first example as a genuine instance of theoretical 
reduction on the authors’ terms. For we have eliminated four terms from the 
theoretical vocabulary (a,a',a'',a'''), and added only three (e,e',e''). Conditions (i)-
(iii) are satisfied, and the replacement of T
2
 by T
1
 represents a simplification and 
greater economy of theoretical vocabulary. The example is unproblematic in the 
sense that it effects what Kemeny and Oppenheim would regard as scientific 
progress in theoretical reduction. It is a nonreplicative reduction, by virtue of the 
fact that it does not involve the replication of distinct tokens of any single 
syntactical term type, distributed over the theory’s explanatory propositions. We 
assume throughout in what follows that the comparative vocabulary K-O model 
preconditions of explanatorily covering all the relevant observational data and 
being at least as well systematized (whatever this is finally understood to mean) 
when a reducing theory replaced a reduced theory. 
5. Theoretical Term Tokens in Vertically Replicative Cases 
The nonreplicative case is well-behaved but statistically atypical of scientific 
reductions. The percentage of possible nonreplicative reductions, supporting a 
matrix of four laws consisting of four scientific terms each, is swamped by the 
percentage of possible replicative cases in which conditions (i)-(iii) are satisfied, 
                                                                        
8 Kemeny and Oppenheim are hesitant about utterly eliminating superfluous terms from 
Voc(T2). See 1956, 17, note 3. Assume that the terms are definitely proven superfluous, 
thereby avoiding extralogical questions of convenience in holding on to technically 
unnecessary theoretical terms. We might consider, however, that such terms not be entirely 
eliminated from broader vocabularies of terms useful in strictly nonscientific explanations 
(e.g., in lay or historical explanations of scientific theories). 
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but in which nothing that Kemeny and Oppenheim would allow intuitively to 
count as a genuine reduction results. The problem is illustrated by the following 
replicative application of the K-O theoretical reduction model. 
Suppose for simplicity sake that primary science T
1
 consists of the 
scientific laws (E,B,C,D), and that, as above, the scientific terms of law E = 
(e,e',e''). Then, where Voc(T
2
) = x, Voc(T
1
) = x – 1 theoretical terms belonging to 
the two vocabularies. Now suppose also that the matrix of theoretical terms for 
both T
2
 and T
1
 for laws (B,C,D) in the nonreplicative case is not identical to the 
matrix of theoretical terms in the following replicative case. We stipulate again 
that E explains O
1
, B explains O
2
, C explains O
3
, and D explains O
4
, when T
2
 is 
reduced to T
1
. We permit restricted replication of scientific terms vertically in 
the matrix, but do not consider horizontal replication. To be precise, we specify 
the scientific terms of the two modified theories in the replicative case in this 
way: 
Voc(T
2
r ) Secondary Theory (Replicative Case) 
A = {a,a',a'',a'''} explains O
1
 
B = {b,b',b'',b'''}   explains O
2
   
C = {c,a',c'',c'''}  explains O
3
   
D = {d,d',d'',d'''}  explains O
4 
The theory is replicative in an obvious sense, because laws A and C share a 
single term a', rather than each containing completely different distinct scientific 
terms. The secondary theory is now K-O theoretically reduced to: 
Voc(T
1
r ) Secondary Theory (Replicative Case) 
E = {e,e',e''} explains O
1
 
B = {b,b',b'',b'''}  explains O
2
   
C = {c,a',c'',c'''}  explains O
3
   
D = {d,d',d'',d'''}  explains O
4 
There are difficulties for the K-O model that the replicative case 
immediately brings to light. Condition (i) is satisfied because both T
2
 and T
1
 
adequately explain O
1
-O
4
. Condition (ii) is also satisfied because Voc(T
2
) = x = 16, 
Voc(T
1
) = x–1 = 15 scientific terms. When we attempt to fulfill condition (iii), 
however, as the K-O model requires whenever conditions (i) and (ii) are met, an 
interesting problem arises.  
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Satisfying condition (iii), we drop T
2
 from our body of theories, and strike 
out the now superfluous theoretical terms in Voc(T
2
) that do not appear in 
Voc(T
1
). In the nonreplicative case we eliminate four terms (a,a',a'',a''') and add 
only three terms (e,e',e''), so that fulfillment of conditions (i)-(iii) effect a genuine 
reduction in such a way as to represent scientific theoretical progress. By 
contrast, in the replicative case, if we strike out the scientific terms that occur in 
Voc(T
2
) that do not occur in Voc(T
1
), we can strike out only the terms (a,a'',a'''), 
but not (a'), because (a') also occurs as a restricted vertical replication instance 
in Voc(T
1
). After all, condition (iii) instructs us only to strike those terms from 
Voc(T
2
) that do not occur in Voc(T
1
). Law C in T
2
 and in T
1
 here consists of the 
terms (e,a',e'',e'''). Thus, we can only eliminate three terms (a,a'',a''') from the 
scientific vocabulary of T
1
 in Voc(T
1
).  
However, since we have also added three terms to Voc(T
1
) (e,e',e''), then, 
despite satisfying K-O model conditions (i)-(iii), no real reduction has been 
effected in the relevant simplification (comparative economy) sense of the K-O 
model, because the theoretical vocabulary of T
1
 has not been simplified or made 
more economical than that of T
2
. The net economy of a K-O comparative 
theoretical vocabulary reduction is necessary for the kind of progress that is 
supposed to characterize a genuine reduction through the replacement of one 
scientific theory by another. Kemeny and Oppenheim are quoted above as 
insisting:  
...we do not recognize the replacement of one theory by another as progress 
unless the new theory compares favorably with the old one in a feature that we 
can very roughly describe as its simplicity... And the special feature of reduction 
is that it accomplishes all this and at the same time allows us to effect an 
economy in the theoretical vocabulary of science.9  
Thus, there are instances in which all three conditions of the K-O model of 
theoretical reduction are satisfied, but where the theory that follows upon 
fulfilment of the conditions does not constitute a genuine theoretical reduction, 
given all that Kemeny and Oppenheim have informally to say about the 
requirements. The reason is that no economy in the scientific vocabulary and 
therefore no progress in science results when the conditions are satisfied in 
some term replicative applications. Is the replicative case significant? Can we 
ignore the problems it poses in light of the usefulness of the nonreplicative cases 
and the limited possibilites of the replicative case, the unlikelihood that it will 
appear among the reductions of otherwise methodologically scrupulous 
systematized theoretical explanations? It is easy to see that the replicative case is 
not a degenerate construction, because the percentage of its occurrences in a 
body of scientific theories projecting a matrix of theoretical terms as they appear 
                                                                        
9 Ibid., 6. 
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in two dimensions, containing theoretical terms in the relevant propositions 
both horizontally and vertically in a list of the theory’s putative truths, is 
enormous compared to the alternative. The replicative case vastly outnumbers 
the nonreplicative cases of theoretical reduction on the K-O model. Moreover, 
important actual T
2
 secondary theories in the history of science and in 
contemporary theoretical explanation almost always (98-99% of the logically 
possible cases) embed a disqualifying vertical syntactical replication of 
theoretical term tokens. 
6. Algebraic Parameters of K-O Theoretical Reduction 
More definite mathematical significance can be offered in support of this 
criticism of the K-O model of comparative theoretical vocabulary reduction, by 
comparing the percentage of possible nonreplicative cases against the 
percentage of possible replicative cases, using the same simplified matrix of 
sixteen scientific terms assigned in sets of four each to each of four scientific 
laws.  
Suppose that the class of nonreplicative cases and the class of replicative 
cases logically exhaust the total possible instances of theories potentially 
entering into a theoretical reduction relation. In the nonreplicative case, there 
are in the simplified case precisely 1,820 possible combinations of terms 
available for nonreplicative reductions satisfying K-O model requirements (i)-
(iii). This is determined combinatorially by the equation n!/r!(n–r)!, relying on 
the same pool of scientific terms, where n = the number of terms in the matrix, 
and r = the groupings of those terms for each law or horizontal coordinate of the 
matrix. In our simplified model, n = 16 and r = 4. Some of these possible 
configurations of scientific terms are uninteresting, such as the difference 
between (a,a',a'',a''') and (a,a'',a''',a'). So the importance of this mathematical 
information is not found in the absolute value of the cardinality of possible 
configurations, but in the ratio obtained by comparison of this indicated number 
with the total number of possible configurations permitted by the conditions of 
restricted vertical syntactical replications of term tokens in the replicative 
case.10 
In the replicative case, further simplified to permit vertical but not 
horizontal replication in the matrix of scientific terms, there are 172,900 
possible configurations of scientific terms. This is determined by the general 
formula L(n!/(n–r)!)-(n!/r!(n–r)!), where, as before, n and r equal respectively 
the number of terms in the matrix and the size of the groupings of the subsets of 
                                                                        
10 Calculation of these values is extremely oversimplified in the application, which is atypical 
of theories and laws in propositional explanations actually used by scientists. Here only four 
laws are involved, with four terms each, and those laws stand in a one-one relation or 
correspondence with the observations they explain. The difficulties are compounded in cases 
dealing with more true-to-life scientific theories. 
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those terms, and where L is the number of scientific laws or horizontal 
coordinates of the matrix. The ratio of these two values of possible 
configurations in the matrix of sixteen scientific terms of the secondary theory to 
be reduced, where the nonreplicative case is compared to the total possible 
configurations in the universe of discourse, including both replicative and 
nonreplicative cases, is 0.0104166. This is to say, that in the limits of our 
universe of discourse of total possible nonreplicative and replicative cases, only 
1.04166% can be of the sort we have called workable nonreplicative cases. The 
remaining 98-99% of such possible cases are unworkable because they are 
replicative. These are the sort of difficulties we encounter if we attempt to apply 
the K-O comparative vocabulary interpretation of theoretical reduction to cases 
of restricted vertical replication of scientific terms in a scientific theory’s 
vocabulary matrix. The replicative instances are transparently generated by 
considering more than one, in fact by considering all the permitted replications 
in the matrix, in contrast with our simplified model in which only a' is replicated 
exactly once. It seems appropriate to conclude that the restricted utility (to 
1.04166% of all possible instances) of the K-O comparative vocabulary model of 
theoretical reduction in the sciences warrants either its total rejection or major 
fundamental redesign. 
7. Vertical Replication of Theoretical Terms in Actual Scientific Theories 
We cannot prove, but we can suggest by way of examples selected entirely at 
random from ancient and contemporary scientific documents, that many if not 
most scientific theories contain laws that exemplify vertical replication of 
theoretical terms.11 For these examples, and many like them, the K-O 
interpretation of theoretical reduction cannot be used to describe or guide a 
reduction to some primary science T
1
.  
First, Galileo writes in De Muto Accelerato (c. 1590): 
1) …bodies of the same material but of unequal volumes move (in natural 
motion) with the same speed. 
2) …when solids lighter than water are completely immersed in water, 
they are carried upward with a force measured by the difference 
between the weight of a volume of water equal to the volume of the 
submerged body and the weight of the body itself. 
3) …if we wish to know at once the relative speeds of a given body in two 
different media, we take an amount of each medium equal to the 
                                                                        
11 Horizontal replications are also possible and frequently occur. For several reasons they are 
not considered in calculating the possible configurations of replicated terms in a matrix that 
specifies the scientific vocabulary of a theory Voc(Tn). The mathematical formula for 
computing the number of possible unrestricted replications of n terms is simply n! (n-
factorial). 
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volume of the body and subtract the weight (of such amounts) of each 
medium the weight of the body. 
4) …in the (natural) downward motion of bodies the ratio of the speeds is 
not equal to the ratio of the weights of the bodies…12 
While in a modern if not especially recent tried-and-true 1968 genetics 
textbook taken down from the shelf we find: 
1) [Chromosomes] duplicate precisely and divide equally in mitosis, 
furnishing each cell with a full complement of chromosomes. 
2) Their behavior in meiosis accords with our expectations of heredity — 
that it is due to contributions from both parents. 
3) Their random mixing and crossing over during meiosis provides an 
important source for the observed variables between individuals. 
4) In addition…chromosome abberations can be associated with the 
inheritance of specific characteristics. 13, 14 
Such instances are typical rather than exceptional among the groupings of 
propositions in an explanatory theory in which syntactically identical term 
tokens appear in several of the propositions according to the pattern we have 
referred to as vertical replication. There is usually a network of token syntactical 
linkages among the propositions advanced for purposes of theoretical 
explanation in a theory, reflected in the matrix of each specific theory’s 
vocabulary of theoretical terms, targeted by the K-O theoretical reduction model 
for comparison in establishing theoretical reduction and reducibility relations 
between any two or more competing explanatory theories.  
8. Countercritique of Theoretical Term Reduction Model Objections 
Problems of several kinds might be raised against the matrix analysis of 
theoretical terms in a scientific theory. We conclude by addressing two such 
complaints, both of which seem dangerous, but on consideration neither of 
which seems to be especially compelling. The second criticism pinpoints exactly 
the philosophical difficulties that seem to be entailed whenever theoretical 
reduction procedures are described by ambiguous reference to syntactical 
‘terms,’ as the main objection to the K-O comparative vocabulary model of 
theoretical reduction. 
                                                                        
12 Galileo 1960 [1590], 29, 33, 35. 
13 Strickberger 1968, 48. 
14 Consult the laws of a theory in almost any ancient or contemporary scientific text. For 
example, Galileo 1933, 203, 209, 218. Newton 1972 [1726]. Bent 1965, 15 (citing Joule’s paper 
“On the Mechanical Equivalent of Heat” (communicated by Michael Faraday to the Royal 
Society in 1849)). Bloss 1971. See also Kimbrough 1979. 
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Criticism 1. It might be objected that counterexample replicative cases do 
not appropriately fit the K-O model of theoretical reduction, because if no 
genuine reduction is effected, that just means that condition (ii) is not satisfied. 
This reasoning misses the point of the argument. For initially condition (ii) is not 
and is not supposed or expected to be satisfied. Voc(T
2
) = x (16 terms), and 
Voc(T
1
) = x – 1 (15 terms). The K-O interpretation then instructs us to enact 
condition (iii). However, when we carry out condition (iii), as previously 
observed, we do not effect a reduction of theories by simplification or economy 
in the theoretical vocabulary. Criticism 1 accordingly overlooks the precise way 
in which the K-O model authors have instructed us to use their schema as a kind 
of decision procedure, and we have followed these instructions in constructing 
our counterexample to criticize it on its own own erritory, and literally in its own 
terms. The simple-minded example presented above contains only one 
replication of a single term a' in the matrix of the relevant theoretical vocabulary. 
If two or more such terms, beginning with a' and b'', were to be vertically 
replicated within the matrix, then in a still significant percentage of total possible 
cases, condition (ii) would turn out to be initially satisfied, but no genuine 
reduction would result. T
1
 would be ‘more complex’ than T
2
, even under the 
deliberate misconstrual of the intentions of the K-O interpretation on which 
Criticism 1 is based. 
Criticism 2. A more serious objection holds that we have no business 
counting a' as it occurs in law A (in T
2
) as a denumerably distinct term from a' as 
it occurs in law C (also in T
2
). If this is true, then the problems of the replicative 
case considered above disappear. For then Voc(T
2
) = 15 instead of 16, and 
Voc(T
1
) = 15 also, for the same reasons as before. Thus, if the argument is to get 
off the ground, we must eliminate a term in Voc(T
1
) in order to initially satisfy 
condition (ii).15 Suppose that we respecify law E to consist of (e,e') instead of 
(e,e',e''), implying that Voc(T
1
) = x – 1, once again, this time = 14. If we fulfill 
condition (iii) under these circumstances, then we do in effect what looks to be a 
genuine theoretical reduction according to the K-O model. We eliminate three 
                                                                        
15 Theory T1 being ‘no more complex than’ T2 may be sufficiently ambiguous to dismiss this 
objection. If theories are constructive propositional entities, then, if the propositions of one 
are simpler than those of the other, then the first theory should be simpler than the second. 
For propositions to be simpler than one another in scientific usage syntactically speaking 
covering the same explanatory obligations with competence and systematization can only be a 
matter of the number of countable theoretical terms contained in the reducing theory’s 
explanatorily competent and well-systematized propositional replacement for the reduced 
theory’s explanations. If you add more terms, you increase the grammatical combinatorics and 
hence the greater complexity of explanations. The greater number of theoretical term tokens, 
the greater potential for complexity, when its explanations stacked up against those of the 
reducing theory with a smaller syntactical theoretical term cardinality. 
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terms (a,a'',a''') from Voc(T
2
) that do not occur in Voc(T
1
), while adding only two 
terms (e,e'). In this application, we simplify and economize the theoretical 
vocabulary in replacing T
2
 with T
1
, thereby ridding the referential domain of as 
many corresponding theoretical concepts and objects. It may therefore seem that 
the application is an example of the nonreplicative case after all. Why indeed 
should we count two theoretical term tokens, a' and a' (say, in classical 
mechanics or kinematics, ‘force’ and ‘force,’ ‘mass’ and ‘mass’) as denumerably 
distinct terms? Why should we count these as two terms instead of two 
replications of a single term? 
The best reason for considering these terms as distinct is that the K-O 
model of theoretical reduction in conditions (i)-(iii) and the authors’ 
surrounding informal discussions, deal solely with ‘terms’ and not with the 
meanings the terms might be assigned. This means that tokens of the very same 
term vertically replicated with the matrix of a theoretical vocabulary can 
potentially mean radically different things. We ought for safety sake then to 
denumerate these replicated terms as discrete and distinct entities in 
determining the number of theoretical terms in a theory’s vocabulary matrix. 
Naturally, it is only good theoretical practice not to use syntactically 
indistinguishable term tokens within a descriptive and explanatory vocabulary 
as having different meanings. Unfortunately, there can be no logical guarantee 
that this is not the case with respect to any particular theory and its theoretical 
terms. Moreover, the K-O model, as we have seen, makes no provision for 
sanitizing the terms in the vocabulary of a theory in a theoretical reduction 
relation on semantic grounds on the basis of the meanings of replicated 
theoretical term tokens within the theoretical vocabulary matrix, prior to 
determining whether or not conditions (i)-(ii) are satisfied, and on the strength 
of meeting those requirements implementing condition (iii). Nor is this the 
problem of meaning-invariance that Paul Feyerabend raises, in which term types 
are thought to change meanings holistically when extended across different 
theoretical frameworks.16 We refer only to term tokens composed of the 
identically same letters or symbols in the same order and their grammatical 
variants that are deliberately or even unnoticed assigned different meanings by 
default within a single theoretical framework. Under ideal circumstances, such 
ambiguities and equivocations could not arise; although in an ideal world 
theoretical reductions would be unnecessary anyway, since all theories would 
already be maximally reduced to the minimal necessary theoretical structures 
and the matrix of their univocally replicating theoretical terms.  
An intuitively trivial example, that the K-O reduction model nevertheless 
does not exclude, if one can forgive the awful puns, projects a set of laws in a 
biological theory containing the terms ‘mole’ meaning ‘a burrowing mammal,’ ‘an 
                                                                        
16 Feyerabend 1962, 34, 41-43. 
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epidermal growth of tissue,’ and ‘a unit of measure, especially volume.’17 There 
can obviously be more subtle differences of meaning in what seem to be identical 
terms vertically and even horizontally replicated in any set of explanatory 
propositions. The metatheoretical choices here are few. The discussion has led to 
recognizing the following two outstanding alternatives. We can either: (a) 
Recalculate by stipulation supported in argument syntactically replicated term 
tokens as distinct entities in the vertical coordinates (and perhaps also in the 
horizontal coordinates) of matrices containing the vocabularies of theoretical 
terms belonging to specific scientific and other kinds of explanatory theories. 
This option has already revealed its limitations, for it is precisely the condition of 
the above replicative term counterexamples to the K-O model, and as such offers 
no respite from its damaging conclusions for the K-O model; or (b) Conclude that 
the K-O model be rejected outright and in its entirety, if it cannot be amended to 
deal adequately semantically somehow with the meanings of theoretical term 
tokens in a theory’s theoretical vocabulary, and not just with the syntactical 
forms of symbols that collectively include all the tokens of the theory’s 
theoretical terms in any single statement of the theory’s totality of putative 
propositional truths or at least its fundamental principles or axioms, also 
characterizable as the theory’s propositional or thetic substance or content. 
What continues to fascinate about the K-O model of theoretical reduction 
is its confident assumption that the possibility of an episode of theoretical 
reduction in the history of science can only be objectively made in supposedly 
purely syntactical terms of competing theoretical vocabularies, in which one 
theory comes to be reduced by and to another. Naturally, it is the relative 
cardinalities of theoretical syntax items in a larger context of all theoretical 
explanations as they are affected by the inclusion of the reduced or reducing 
theory that matter. A reducing theory in genetic biochemistry might make use of 
many theoretical concepts that are already part of chemistry, and use overall 
more theoretical terms in its explanations of a predecessor pre-DNA biological 
theory of genes, but still result in an integrated scientific network of 
explanations in which overall the number of syntactically distinct theoretical 
terms is diminished. The applications we have considered must all be considered 
accordingly as miniaturized versions of the complete scientific explanatory 
situation before and after a reduction, in which the total number of theoretical 
terms are compared when a theoretical reduction is considered. They are on 
each side the before and after theoretical term portraits of the reduced and 
reducing theories in the broadest context representing all theoretical terms in all 
theoretical explanations.18 
                                                                        
17 Or consider the less trivial fact that ‘gram’ in a chemical theory can mean either ‘weight’ or 
‘mass,’ or, if the term is replicated, might mean both in different laws. 
18 I am grateful to several anonymous readers who have offered useful suggestions for 
improvement of previous drafts of the essay. 
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